CAIRO, Egypt March 24 —
Saddam Hussein's most trusted paramilitary militia, Saddam's
Fedayeen, has assassinated the Iraqi leader's enemies, put down
protests and ruthlessly cracked down on dissidents since its
founding in 1995.
Now, with U.S.-led coalition troops advancing toward Baghdad,
Saddam's Fedayeen whose name means "those ready to sacrifice
themselves for Saddam" are putting up stiff resistance and trying to
prevent regular army soldiers from surrendering.
Reports from the front suggest Fedayeen members may have
organized battlefield ruses, like posing as civilians or faking
surrender, to trap U.S. and British forces. Such scenes played out
in An Nasiriyah and Umm Qasr, where the advancing troops suffered
their first major casualties.
The result of the Fedayeen activity, intended or not, is to sow
suspicion and division between the invading troops and the civilians
and stop any uprising against Saddam.
U.S. intelligence believes the Fedayeen were dispatched from
their strongholds in the Baghdad area to outlying areas over the
last few weeks.
Gen. Tommy Franks, speaking Monday in Qatar, said U.S. forces had
"intentionally bypassed enemy formations," and the Fedayeen had been
harassing the U.S. rear in southern Iraq.
"We know that the Fedayeen has in fact put himself in a position
to mill about, to create difficulties in rural areas," Franks said.
"I can assure you that contact with those forces is not
unexpected."
The guerrillas were formed to quash internal dissent and
disturbances after Iraq's defeat in the 1991 Gulf War, especially in
the oppressed Shiite Muslim areas in central and southern Iraq. The
first recruits all extremely loyal to the ruling Baath party
included criminals who were pardoned in exchange for serving in the
units.
Analysts estimate the force could number 40,000, broken into
brigades of 3,000 each. Training includes urban warfare and suicide
missions. One of their endurance drills is to survive on snakes and
dog meat.
They dress in black uniforms and cover their faces with black
scarves to instill fear, although they also have been known to
operate in civilian clothes.
Ali Abdel Amir, an Iraqi journalist operating in neighboring
Jordan, said Saddam trusts the force even more than his elite
Republican Guard.
"They have blind loyalty, they might even kill their fathers if
they are ordered to do so," he told The Associated Press from
Amman.
Fedayeen members receive up to $100 a month, compared with the $3
government employees are paid each month. They receive plots of land
and other privileges, such as extra food rations and free medical
care.
The Fedayeen report directly to Saddam's eldest son, Odai, a
powerful figure in Iraq with a reputation for extravagance and
violence.
In 1998, Fedayeen members swept the Shiite city of Karbala
looking for would-be assassins of Izzat Ibrahim, Saddam's deputy on
the Revolution Command Council, Iraq's highest executive body.
Ibrahim survived, and hundreds of people were arrested in the
sweeps.
In 1999, the Fedayeen were responsible for a crackdown on Shiites
in a Baghdad suburb who were protesting the assassination of Grand
Ayatollah Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr, a leading Iraqi Shiite cleric, and
his two sons in the holy city of Najaf. Dozens of people were killed
in the operation.
This month, Al Zawra, a weekly newspaper owned by Odai, reported
that Fedayeen units were sent to the southern town of Al-Majar to
crush a protest by villagers. They reportedly destroyed three houses
and took the families into custody.
Earlier this month, U.S. officials claimed Fedayeen members were
acquiring military uniforms "identical down to the last detail" to
those worn by American and British forces and planned to use them to
shift blame for atrocities.
Middle East military analysts, however, say the force is too
poorly equipped to match the U.S. troops.
"They are a little nuisance that can make some trouble, but not
hinder the advance of the troops," said Mohammed Qadri Saeed, a
military analyst at the Cairo-based Al Ahram Center for Strategic
Studies.
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